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WHAT IF THERE IS NO CLIENT?:
PROSECUTORS AS "COUNSELORS" OF
CRIME VICTIMS
STACY CAPLOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a teacher in a criminal practice-based clinic, I often feel like
an eavesdropper on the discourse among clinicians about lawyering
skills and professional values. Both the context of, and the language
describing, criminal law practice, are sufficiently different from civil
practice to make it difficult to teach many of the lessons and ap-
proaches developed in traditional texts used in clinical education, par-
ticularly those concerned with client-counseling.'
The dissonance between the sounds heard in a criminal and civil
practice was loud when I was teaching a criminal defense clinic. When
I moved on to teach an in-house prosecutor's clinic, the discord be-
came deafening.2 My experience in a prosecutor's program, which I
* Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, Brooklyn Law School. Many
thanks to Minna Kotkin for reading an early draft of this piece, to Randi Korobelnick for
her reliable research assistance, to Paulette Thielman and Joanne Colonna for their tireless
secretarial help, to Susan Herman, Nan Hunter, and Liz Schneider for their enduring sup-
port, and to the generous Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Program.
1 The preeminent texts are ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTER-
VIEWING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
(1990); DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSEL-
ORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S.
REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1977); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEL-
ING (2d ed. 1987). Only GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, LAWYERING PROCESS: CRIMI-
NAL PROBLEM SUPPLEMENT (1978), develops criminal defense practice with the kind of
detail conducive to inspiring reflection that clinicians usually apply to civil practice
situations.
2 Faculty-supervised clinics in which students personally handle the prosecution of the
case are unusual. The more typical model is an extemship that places students in local and
federal prosecutors' offices under the supervision of an attorney, a conclusion confirmed
by recent exchanges on the lawclinic listserv. The advantages of the faculty-supervised
prosecution model were examined in detail by Karen Knight who teaches one of those few
in-house prosecution clinics. To Prosecute is Human, 75 NEB. L. REV. 847 (1996). See also
Martin H. Belsky, Review Essay: On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U. L REV.
1485, 1496-1500 (1984); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Concep-
tual Framework, 15 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 197 (1988) (Prof. Fisher, who taught Professional
Responsibility at Boston University School of Law to students prosecuting cases, partially
based this article on some of their experiences and observations). For an early CLEPR-
published discussion of prosecutor clinics see MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE PROSECUTOR
CLINICS (1974).
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began after many years of teaching a live-client defense clinic and sev-
eral externships, posed many atypical, idiosyncratic pedagogical is-
sues, none more paradoxical than whether and how to teach
counseling in the absence of a client.3 The separateness I had always
felt practicing and teaching about criminal law never felt wider than
when I tried to explore approaches to relationships between prosecu-
tors and the individual crime victims whose interests they ostensibly
represented. I was now excluded even from the client-related con-
cerns of my criminal defense clinical colleagues.
When clinicians write about criminal practice they almost always
describe defense work.4 This scholarship has little utility for the pros-
ecutor who is balancing a different set of goals and interests, and who
often is the target at which this defense-oriented advice is aimed. 5 For
these reasons, the standard texts also are of limited use to those of us
who teach in prosecutor clinics. 6 Although it is possible to cull materi-
3 Student prosecutor programs are wholly dependent on the cooperation of the office
with which the clinic is affiliated since only the duly elected or appointed prosecutor has
legal authority to prosecute a case. Thus, the clinic is obligated to follow office policies and
norms, as well as to obey any specific instructions emanating from the office. Most of the
time, this simply means that the students have to fill out office forms and use certain per-
sonnel or resources. Sometimes, however, office directives or customs interfere with the
kind of open-ended case planning and theory development clinicians try to teach. For
example, the negotiation process is limited when office policy mandates that a particular
plea offer must be made in every case in a certain category. Deprived of the ability to
develop their own plan, students in this situation will learn less about negotiation than
students with more independence. Given their relatively light caseloads, clinic students
also dedicate much more time and effort to what is often their first lawyering experience.
For example, they usually have much more victim contact which enables them to speak in
court and to negotiate with defense attorneys with more first-hand knowledge of the facts.
Full-time ADAs often rely on hearsay notes in a file and sometimes are forced to make
compromises because they are unprepared to rebut assertions by better informed defense
attorneys. Ironically, when this happens on occasion, judges have criticized my students
for being more "hard-nosed" and "unreasonable" than the "regular" ADAs.
4 See, e.g., BELLOW & MOULTON, supra note 1; ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER (Rodney J. Uphoff ed. 1995) (many chapters were written by
clinicians); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the
Sensitive New-Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1993); Charles J.
Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993).
5 For example, the literature about negotiation aimed at defense attorneys usually at-
tempts to analyze prosecutorial psychology or to offer strategies for handling DAs. See,
e.g., Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation,
46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 73-82 (1985); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as
Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 73 (1995).
6 Although the majority of prosecutor clinics are externships, supra note 2, most offer
classroom components in which the skills in question, as well as the prosecutorial role, are
considered. The dearth of background reading is problematic for any clinical teacher seek-
ing to assign materials and to make the classroom a locus for critical inquiry rather than
only case-rounds. As Bob Dinerstein observed: "In the field of clinical legal education,
textbooks matter . . [c]linical texts organize what we think we know about the world of
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als from a variety of sources about substantive criminal law and proce-
dure, as well as topics such as plea bargaining, ethical obligations of
prosecutors, and trial skills, there is very little writing about the com-
munications that resemble client counseling which take place between
a prosecutor and the crime victim. 7 This is a regrettable gap which
ignores an important segment of legal practice, in which many of our
students find entry-level employment. Moreover, to the extent that
clinical theories of practice have influenced other areas, they have had
little direct impact on prosecution. 8
Writings by and about prosecutors also fail to address the relation
between prosecutor and crime victim.9 Any mention - and there are
very few - of the prosecutor's responsibility to the crime victim is a
cursory acknowledgment of some basic consideration owed. 10 The
only serious and substantive discussion of the nature of the relation-
ship can be found in some recent writings about domestic violence
"no-drop" policies that describe the shifting balance of prosecutor-
victim decision making control.11
lawyers and lawyering." Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 697 (1992).
7 In my search, I found only one book that had materials relating to a victim interview.
SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 2-1 - 2-32, contains the transcript of an interview
of a rape victim followed by some questions and problems. Of all crime victims to present
to students, this choice is questionable given the conceded special skills and sensitivities
required to compassionately, yet professionally, interview a rape victim. In most prosecu-
tors' offices, rape cases are handled in designated units by more experienced, specially
trained, assistant district attorneys.
8 As more and more students participate in law school clinics in which interviewing
and counseling are taught, many neophyte ADA's will have been exposed during law
school to concepts that they incorporate, even unwittingly, into their interactions with
others.
9 See. e.g., JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
(1980) (in chapters on external factors affecting prosecution, no mention of victim); DAVID
M. NISSMAN & ED HAGAN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1982) (in chapter on ethical
considerations, no mention of crime victim). I also skimmed some popular books by and
about prosecutors, but found no mention of how a prosecutor does or should relate to the
crime victim. See, e.g., MARIO MEROLA, BIG CITY D.A. (1988) (autobiography of former
District Attorney of the Bronx); JAMES MILLS, THE PROSECUTOR (1968) (author observed
ADAs in Queens County District Attorney's Office); JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECU-
TORS (1987) (inside look at various state and federal prosecutors' offices).
10 The sole reference to interviewing a crime victim that I found was in an advice book
to prosecutors. MICHAEL MARCUS, TRIAL PREPARATION FOR PROSECUTORS (1989). In
the how-to chapter "Interviewing Witnesses," the author treats victims no differently than
witnesses. The shallowness of this book's treatment of the subject is exemplified by this
solitary reference: "Crime victims and eyewitnesses should always be interviewed at the
crime scene where they will be better able to explain the circumstances of the crime ... 
Id. at 72.
11 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Do-
mestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1898-1900 (1996); Angela Corsilles,
No Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases; Guarantee to Action or
Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 872-76 (1994). A no-drop policy restricts
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The critical absence of an individual client to whom a lawyer
owes allegiance and whose confidences are protected distinguishes
prosecutors from most other lawyers engaged in litigation. 12 Essen-
tially, the prosecutor makes decisions unilaterally and avoids the pro-
cess of, and the values underlying, client-centered decision making.
Wherever a lawyer may fall on the continuum of client counseling ap-
proaches regarding the extent and degree of client deference, the de-
bate is academic in the prosecutorial world. The realm of the
prosecutor is characterized by virtually unreviewable discretion, and
expansive authority which is rarely circumscribed by the courts,13 and
restrained only slightly by official self-regulation, 14 or personal self-
governance. 15
Although the client-centeredness model is the most dominant
amongst clinicians, it is nonetheless debatable whether it is followed in
its pure form in the real world of practice. Crediting clients with an
awareness of their problems and possible solutions, this model in-
forms and empowers clients to take responsibility for choosing among
possible alternative outcomes. This approach also acknowledges the
complexities of the attorney-client relationship in which the former is
more than a mere technical advisor and the latter has some personal
expertise or ideas about the underlying issues that prompted the
consultation.
None of the values embraced by client-centered decision making,
the ultimate goal of client-centered counseling, feature in the
the prosecutor's discretion to dismiss a case simply because the victim does not want to
continue the case and denies the victim the exclusive choice of withdrawing a complaint I
use the term "individual client" to describe a one-client, one-lawyer relationship in con-
trast to representation of entities or groups. There are numerous examples of lawyers who
do not advocate on behalf of an individual client.
12 1 use the term "individual client" to describe a one-client/one-lawyer relationship in
contrast to representation of entities or groups. There are numerous examples of lawyers
who do not advocate on behalf of individual clients but even those lawyers who represent
government or corporations must defer to the decisions of those who speak on behalf of
those entities such as agency counsel or corporate director. Moreover, many lawyers who
represent groups either as an organization or a class struggle with conflicts between indi-
vidual and collective goals. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individ-
ual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation or
Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (pre-trial change in charge is
a proper exercise of discretion); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (selection
of charge is a proper exercise of discretion); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 257 (1978)
(plea bargaining part of prosecutorial discretion); see generally, Norman Abrams, Internal
Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. (1971).
14 E.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, UNITED STATES ATroRNEY'S MANUAL, <http://www/us-
doj.gov./usao/ousa/foia reading-room/usam>.
15 Benjamin R. Civiletti, The Prosecutor as Advocate, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1979)
("[I1n the end, self-governance is the essential restraint.").
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prosecutorial decision about whether, whom and what to charge, what
plea offer to make, and what sentence to recommend. 16 Neither client
autonomy, empowerment, cooperative decision making, confidential-
ity, nor personal accountability to the client are serious concerns for a
prosecutor. To most prosecutors, these are foreign notions that might
not even be part of their ordinary world view, unless they had been
introduced to these ideas in law school. While many prosecutors are
willing to engage with victims during the case preparation, few defer
to the victim in critical decision making where there are disagree-
ments about the direction of the prosecution. 17 Even when the prose-
cutor's choices reflect the victims' goals, this coincidence is usually
fortuitous rather than the product of deference. In short, while prose-
cutors perform a multi-faceted role, they are not counselors of clients.
My claim is that client-centeredness is more than a technique of
structuring information gathering from and advice-giving to a client.
It is the behavioral manifestation of a choice of values about law-
yering that can exist in all areas of practice, even where there is no
individual client.18 I propose that these values can be translated into a
victim-centered prosecution, an improvement on the traditional ap-
proach to prosecution in which the victim is only one of the prosecu-
tor's many constituents, enjoying no special privileges. 19 In addition,
16 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 2, at 255-57; BINDER, ET AL., supra note 2, at
17-18. See also, Robert L. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 502 (1990).
17 This is not to say that a prosecutor never considers a victim's goals, concerns, fears,
or needs. Individual prosecutors can be humane, caring, and sympathetic, open to hearing
about the victim's feelings. Yet, one study reported that only 41% of the prosecutors sur-
veyed were concerned about the victim's opinion of a plea bargain. William F. McDonald,
Henry H. Rossman, & James A. Cramer, The Prosecutor's Plea Bargaining Decisions, in
THE PROSECUTOR 173 (William F. McDonald ed. 1979). Furthermore, compassion to vic-
tims does not lead necessarily to a relinquishment of prosecutorial control. These authors
also reported that a victim's wishes were rarely considered in plea bargaining except in
high-publicity and rape cases. Id. at 160.
At sentencing, in particular, victim involvement often is sought by prosecutors in an
effort to persuade the judge to sentence more harshly. The Supreme Court in Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) permitted the practice of victim impact statements at capi-
tal sentencing proceedings. Victim impact evidence is intended to influence the sentencing
court at the conclusion of the case, not the prosecutor during the earlier stages of the
adjudication process. Moreover, victim impact evidence is typically, even blatantly, emo-
tional, calling in question its value to the judge. Some commentators defend their use, see,
e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in
LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 135 (1996), while others criticize
them, see, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996).
18 Steve Ellmann makes this point when he argues that despite differences in the tech-
niques needed to represent groups in public interest litigation, "[t]he elements of a well-
considered decision are the same for a.group as for an individual." Ellmann, supra note 12,
at 1132.
19 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 759-60 (1986) ("The office of
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if we teach students a client-centered model of decision making and
then they go to work in a prosecutor's office, they may find ways of
retaining and using their capacity to engage in the kind of interactions
inherent in a client-centered model even if they have to struggle
against the classic prosecutorial archetype. Despite the professional
norms and traditions shaping the relative roles of prosecutors and vic-
tims, prosecutors and students in prosecutors' clinics should be able to
incorporate more of the victim's interests and objectives into their de-
cisions while balancing the fiduciary responsibility of the prosecutor to
protect the public interest and integrity of the office.
This essay has two parts. In the first, I will draw on my back-
ground in both state prosecution and defense as a practitioner and a
clinical teacher to argue briefly that criminal and civil practice differ
sufficiently to make many of the themes of clinical education more
difficult to apply. I will sketch portraits of the traditional prosecutor
and crime victim, and discuss their customary relationship. For the
purposes of this discussion, the term "crime victim" refers to the
thousands of everyday victims of such crimes as robbery, larceny, bur-
glary, or assault who command neither headlines, community atten-
tion, nor other special treatment that might privilege their personal
preferences. 20 The prosecutions of the cases arising out of these
crimes would be characterized as "routine." In the second part, using
transcripts from two movies, The Accused21 and Criminal Justice22 to
illustrate some of the mistakes prosecutors make, I will propose a
model of victim-centered prosecution that borrows the fundamental
values of collaboration, participation, and communication inherent in
client-centered lawyering.23
prosecutor can best be conceptualized as a lawyer with no client but with several important
constituencies," including the police, victims of crime, other government agencies and the
courts).
20 The term "victim" connotes a person who "suffers a loss or injury as a result of an act
that constitutes a crime under federal, state or local law." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
CRIME ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION IN LAW SCHOOL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CRIMI-
NAL LAW COURSES 10 (1988). The Department of Justice developed a working definition
of a victim as "someone who suffers, direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial
harm as a result of the commission of a crime." See 48 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1983) (interpreta-
tion of the "Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 1512).
21 THE ACCUSED (PARAMOUNT PICTURES 1988).
22 CRIMINAL JUSTICE (HBO 1990).
23 These movies, familiar to many readers, offer two versions of a prosecutor-crime
victim relationship. My exemplars are drawn from the movies rather than real interactions
because my clinic usually did not videotape witness interviews. To do so would be poor
lawyering, except in the unusual case where preservation of testimony would be prudent.
In many jurisdictions, statements of testifying witnesses must be disclosed at trial to the
defense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500; FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2; Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961). Since any recorded version of the
witnesses story could be used for impeachment, few prosecutors risk memorializing their
[Vol. 5:1
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II. PROSECUTORS, VICTIMS AND THEIR WORLDS
A. Lawyering in a Criminal Practice
Several factors distinguish the typical criminal practice from its
civil counterpart. First, since most cases begin with an arrest and a
prosecution, criminal practice is, from the outset, almost always adver-
sarial in nature and stance. The two sides rarely have equal resources
and stature. In criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has enormous,
disproportionate power to wield against the defendant, although not
necessarily to the benefit of the crime victim. While these characteris-
tics are hardly unique to criminal practice, the critical difference is in
the degree and intensity of the resulting emotions. Even when law-
yers in the adversarial criminal practice setting might be inclined to
cooperate in order to achieve such shared goals as a negotiated guilty
plea or a diversion program, any surface harmony conceals much an-
tagonism. 24 The second major difference between these two areas of
practice is that there are inherent entrenched tensions, suspicions, and
emotions in a high-volume criminal justice system where individual
liberties are at stake. The emotional atmosphere is intensified by the
tragic and depressing circumstances of the individuals involved.
Most criminal practitioners are associated with institutions such
as the public defender or the district attorney, or are specialists in the
private bar. As such, they are repeat performers with well-known rep-
utations and abilities in that closed community. In this courthouse
culture, personality, integrity and credibility (or the lack thereof) may
play a larger than normal role since the same individual attorneys in-
teract daily. While mutual respect might develop, distrust and posi-
tional advocacy are commonplace. Where prosecutors believe that
defense counsel use underhanded tactics, defense attorneys suspect
misconduct by prosecutors. These role-derived suspicions and anxie-
ties must coexist with the prosecutor's other roles of representing
community values and concerns, serving a justice ideal, preserving
witness's words in writing, let alone on videotape. Also, the movies dramatize the conflict
more vividly than any actual conversation would.
24 Some commentators have noticed that at least in the context of plea bargaining,
regular contact between prosecutors and defense attorneys may lead to increasingly coop-
erative relationships that are part of the very fabric of the adjudication process. See e.g.,
Malcolm Feely, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYs. J.
338, 341-42 (1982). In one study, the author not surprisingly discovered that a majority of
prosecutors are more inclined to cooperate with defense attorneys who were "friendly,
communicative, unabrasive, and easy to deal with." Juanita Jones, Prosecutors and Public
Defenders: Cooperative Relationships and Non-Negotiable Cases, in THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE
SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAW 199 (Burton Atkins and Mark Pogrebin eds. 1978).
Similar attitudes were described in William F. McDonald, Henry H. Rossman & James A.
Crasser, The Prosecutor's Plea Bargaining Decisions, in THE PROSECUTOR 159-160 (Wil-
liam F. McDonald ed. 1979).
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fairness in the procedures, searching for the truth, and observing and
enforcing legal constraints that govern themselves and their agents.
Adversarialness is the norm, resulting in instances of misconduct and
abuse of discretion, at the expense of the more judicial or managerial
roles which call for more self-confident independent judgment.25 This
so-called "adversary model" is characterized by its identification with
law enforcement, its emphasis on winning and obtaining convictions,
and an inclination to "get tough. '26
There also are enormous environmental differences between the
most criminal and civil practice settings, at least in state court criminal
practice. Many criminal cases transpire in the pressure-cooker of the
courtroom, the courthouse hallways, or some kind of lock-up. For ex-
ample, because a speedy arraignment is a due process right, the initial
client interview is often hasty and superficial, focused on the issues of
a release decision or quick guilty plea. Judges, often coping with long
calendars in crowded, edgy courtrooms, can exacerbate the stress by
being impatient, intolerant, or coercive. Prosecutors carry large case
loads and, as such, are often unfamiliar with the facts of a particular
case, educating themselves at a hasty hallway conversation or from a
file, rather than from an in-depth discussion with someone with first-
hand knowledge. The same description applies to many public de-
fenders who shoulder burdensome caseloads.2 7
Certainly, the distinctions mentioned above are not universally
true, and civil lawyers could argue persuasively that many of these
attitudes and conditions are no different in their areas of practice.
The key characteristic which inexorably separates criminal and civil
practice and propels this essay is that only one of the interested par-
25 It is often easier to theorize about abstract obligations to fairness and justice than put
them into practice. In job interviews with District Attorneys, students report that it is
standard to be asked about situations in which their understanding of the dual role of the
prosecutor is tested. In the hypothetical, the better answer would require them to dismiss,
refuse to bring charges, or release a dangerous defendant because the prosecutor has a
higher obligation to the public and the law than simply to seek convictions. In reality,
when adverse consequences might flow from such a decision, most of the interviewers
themselves probably would try to avoid the very result they advocate to the job-seekers.
Yet, they downgrade the applicant who gives the answer that actually resembles the course
of action that might occur in a real case. In other words, it is not so easy to practice what
you preach.
26 LEIF CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER 66-68 (1974) (suggesting that the crime fighter
type is undesirable); Pamela J. Utz, Two Models of Prosecutorial Professionalism, THE
PROSECUTOR 103-09 (William F. McDonald ed. 1979); Fisher, supra note 2, at 204-08.
27 A recent study of the quality of legal representation provided indigent criminal de-
fendants reported an average of 650 cases per Legal Aid Society lawyer in Manhattan.
This overwhelming caseload caused lawyers to show up late, leaving their clients to wait
long hours in the courtroom or in holding cells, only to have a stand-in lawyer postpone or
even mishandle the case. David Rohde, Decline is Seen in Legal Help for City's Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at B1.
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ties in a criminal case, namely the defendant, is a "client."
B. The Traditional Prosecutor
Most basic Criminal Law courses begin with some discussion of
the differences between criminal and civil sanctions in which students
learn that community judgment and condemnation distinguishes the
former from the latter. After teasing out some comments, the first
year Criminal Law student might conclude that a crime "is conduct
which ... will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral
condemnation of the community. ' 28 From the outset, the purpose of
criminalizing conduct is justified by a societal need to impose public
punishment independent from the private motives, needs, and inter-
ests of the victim.
The instrument of this process in the American criminal justice
system is the public prosecutor, an office that has evolved from the
private prosecutor of Colonial times to the modern version. The vic-
tim's role in initiating the criminal process has disappeared in favor of
prosecution by a public, independent, and by now, wholly professional
agency. 29 In theory, the prosecutor is detached from the arrest deci-
sion, objective about whether and what crimes to charge, and equita-
ble in determining whether and to what charges the defendant can
plead guilty. The prosecutor balances the often conflicting priorities
of the community, the victim, the defendant, and the judiciary while
enforcing legislative goals and constitutional mandates. Although
tempered by office policies and prosecutorial priorities, the individual
prosecutor has broad powers and discretion, and operates as a free
agent, making myriad daily judgments and decisions, hopefully in a
lawful, ethical, and honorable fashion.
None of these wide-ranging responsibilities - law enforcement
officer, elected official, officer of the court, administrator, gatekeeper
- require the prosecutor to assume the role of counselor to crime
victims. 30 It is beyond debate that crime victims are not clients of the
28 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401
(1958), as quoted in JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1994); see also GEORGE E. Dix
& M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 63 (4th ed. 1996).
29 JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3-43 (1980); JOHN F. LAWLESS, in
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 3-7 (Supp. 1988); William F. McDonald, The Prosecutor's
Domain, THE PROSECUTOR 19-28 (William F. McDonald ed. 1979); Juan Cardenas, The
Crime Victim in the Prosecutional Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 357, 364-72 (1986);
Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of
Issues. and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 127-32 (1984).
30 In many prosecutors' offices, there are other resources for counseling. Psychological
counseling may be available. Para or non-professional staff may act as liaison with the
victim, explaining the court system and the process of the case. For victims who do not
speak English, these kinds of contacts may be less frequent and less informative. The in-
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prosecutor because prosecutors "represent" an amorphous entity of
the "people," "state," or "government."
Yet, since this entity has no identifiable voice or spokesperson
articulating its goals for particular cases, the prosecutor's representa-
tional duties are often self-defined. In 1935, the Supreme Court char-
acterized the multi-dimensional role of the prosecutor in a now-classic
formulation:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty... whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. He is ... the servant of the law .... 31
Formal guidelines for prosecutorial conduct, describe the conse-
quences of this unique relationship as follows:
[W]here it is practical to do so, the prosecutor should give victims
an opportunity to consult and to provide relevant information prior
to the prosecutor's taking [a] final action. Since, however, the pros-
ecutor's client is not the victim but the people who live in the prose-
cutor's jurisdiction, the prosecutor obviously retains the
discretionary authority to make such decisions without regard to the
victim's - or any other person's - views on the matter.32
Thus, however sympathetic and concerned a prosecutor may be about
the painful experiences of a crime victim, the relationship is typically
conducted at a safe distance that discourages connections and attach-
ments and functions along clearly established lines of power and con-
trol. Moreover, the quasi-judicial role of the prosecutor requiring
fidelity to a host of institutional and societal goals and values pre-
cludes the partisanship and loyalty owed-a client and mandates an al-
legiance to truth-seeking, impartiality, and objectivity. 33 Even in an
terpreter becomes the victim's lifeline to an understanding of what is happening when non-
English speaking victims are involved. Thus, a host of non-prosecutors, and often non-
lawyers, give advice to crime victims.
31 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). "[T]he client of every prosecutor is
the public." WOLFRAM supra note 19, at 760.
32 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Prosecution Function § 3-3.2 (3d ed.
1992). Other sources of professional norms governing prosecutorial behavior can be found
in the NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN-
DARDS § 26.1 (1977); CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 7-13 (1981) (prosecu-
tor represents the sovereign and makes decisions "normally made by an individual
client."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8 (as amended 1996).
33 Abbe Smith, lifelong criminal defense attorney, recounts the difficulties of her cross-
over experience when she allied with a prosecutor to protect the interests of her client, the
victim of a brutal, homophobic assault. Although she describes the prosecutor handling
the case as quite receptive and sympathetic, at times his prosecutorial instincts diverged
from Abbe's client-oriented goals and her defense-oriented expectations. Abbe Smith, On
Representing the Victim of Crime, in LAW STORIES 149-67 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow
eds. 1996).
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adversarial setting, in the pursuit of justice (whatever that elusive and
subjective term actually means), the crime victim's goals necessarily
do not occupy a primary position. For example, the prosecutor must
follow the law even if it means the suppression of evidence harmful to
the defendant or the disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant
despite the risk of losing the case and perhaps failing to secure the
victim's goals. Indeed, in the final analysis, the crime victim is merely
a witness, with a limited role to play, and is basically dependent on the
prosecutor for information and support.34
Despite the absence of an individual client, prosecutors often ap-
pear to be representing the interests of crime victims, and when those
interests do not conflict with any preemptive justice goals, articulate
the interests of the victim to the defense attorney and judge. In addi-
tion, even though the individual victim is off-stage, the prosecutor fre-
quently casts a particular victim in the role of every-victim, thereby
conflating the role of guardian of the public welfare with the protector
of individual interests.35 Even in the absence of a client, the prosecu-
tor often resorts to the rhetoric of representation raising arguments
about redress of individual harm, restitution, and victim-based con-
cerns and goals.
Although the platitude that prosecutors serve the public interest
implies that the prosecutor indeed has a client, for the most part this
client is a silent, invisible entity, indifferent to the decisions and
choices the prosecutor makes.36 In turn, in routine cases, those deci-
34 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victims' Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defen-
dant, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 135, 138-39. To do their jobs, prosecutors also depend on
the participation and cooperation of types of witnesses who have a very different set of
interests and concerns than a party, some of which are unique to criminal prosecution.
Prosecutors rely heavily on law enforcement witnesses, who ostensibly have no stake in the
outcome of a case, and who are part of the system rather than involuntary participants. In
many cases, a prosecutor relies on cooperating witnesses, who have been immunized, given
deals, or otherwise coerced to testify. Interviewing and counseling those types of wit-
nesses, skills related to fact-gathering and case theory development, are fundamentally the
same in criminal and civil cases. For example, the discussion of basic witness interviewing
principles in BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 2, at 199-202, includes two illustrations,
one criminal and one civil.
35 Fisher, supra note 2, at 209. One study questioned prosecutors and police about
their perception of the attorney-client relationship between the prosecutor and the crime
victim. Eighty-four percent of the prosecutors agreed that the prosecutor's primary re-
sponsibility is to the citizens of his country, who, as a group represent the prosecutor's
clientele. More surprisingly, 45% of the prosecutors agreed that the prosecutor and the
crime victim function under an attorney-client relationship. Donald M. McIntyre, Impedi-
ments to Effective Police-Prosecutor Relationships, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 219 (1975).
36 When a case generates a lot of attention in the community or a lot of publicity, the
notion of the "people" becomes more concrete and more politically charged. While no
prosecutor would admit to giving special treatment to a case that is in the public eye, there
are more factors to balance when prosecutorial decisions are subject to public scrutiny and
reaction. In such cases, prosecutors, who are largely elected officials with considerable
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sions and choices are often invisible to the crime victim, the public,
and anyone else outside the system. Indeed, the prosecutor has obli-
gations to so many other constituencies, that decision making neces-
sarily calls for a delicate balancing of these interests.
If a prosecutor chooses to act in a manner associated with a coun-
selor - consulting, explaining, including, deferring - that role is as-
sumed voluntarily when an individual prosecutor determines that the
case necessitates such inclusion. Even so, the terms of this relation-
ship are set unilaterally by the prosecutor, usually when inclusion ben-
efits the case. Even when a victim is included, in this one-sided
arrangement the prosecutor retains the trump card in the decision
making process. It is the prosecutor who ultimately makes the charg-
ing, plea, and sentence recommendation decisions whether or not the
victim endorses those choices.
The prosecutor's unique client-independent, yet quasi-represen-
tational, role is not replicated in other litigation contexts. A civilian
crime victim who might initiate a civil suit against the defendant is the
client of the lawyer handling the matter. In a criminal case the identi-
cal individual is not entitled to receive from the prosecutor the same
loyalty, zeal, or even competence, the bedrock values of ethical repre-
sentation. Most prosecutors are chary of victim participation, fearing
undue interference with their case processing,37 resulting in at best
begrudging, minimal inclusion in, but more often virtual exclusion
from, all decision making.
To what extent should prosecutors communicate with and take
into account a crime victim's interests? Certainly, the prosecutor im-
plicitly considers the harm suffered by the victim and the victim's
goals in any calculation of "justice," nonetheless the conventional wis-
dom that exempts people who have been harmed criminally from hav-
ing a direct and meaningful voice seems entrenched. Yet, if the case is
tried, it will be the victim's voice and story that the prosecutor needs
in order to convict. This creates the paradox that the prosecutor must
forge a bond in order to motivate the victim, but may abandon the
victim when his or her cooperation is no longer necessary.
For most crime victims, the criminal process will be their only
source of vindication. 38 Although a crime victim has civil recourse in
a law suit against the defendant, for several obvious reasons, few vic-
tims ever sue the wrongdoers who harms them. First, many defen-
political savvy, do not delegate to their assistants the kind of independent discretion that
they ordinarily enjoy in more routine matters.
37 David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of "Just Deserts" and Victim Partici-
pation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 874 (1992).
38 Gittler, supra note 29, at 138-39.
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dants are judgment-proof. Second, the victim often lacks the
resources to hire a lawyer to file a civil suit. Also, most civil suits are
deferred for legal and strategical reasons until the conclusion of the
criminal case, an event which might occur years after the incident. Fi-
nally, if the defendant is convicted and sentenced to prison, even the
victim with the resources and the will to proceed may be sufficiently
satisfied or too exhausted to pursue a civil suit, preferring to bring
closure to the entire episode. Given all of these disincentives, it is
unlikely that most victims will have any opportunities other than the
criminal case to seek redress, or to confront the defendant and testify
about what happened.
A crime victim is not merely another witness for the prosecution.
Unlike the usual cooperating, expert, or eyewitnesses, or the law en-
forcement agent, the civilian complaining witness has an acknowl-
edged stake in the case and frequently exhibits many of the same
traits, expects the same considerations, and attempts to assert the
same prerogatives as civil clients. For example, crime victims may be-
lieve that they are entitled to have a say in the charging decision or
expect to have some control over the disposition of a case and to dis-
approve of the prosecutor's plea bargain. This view by the victim of
her role in the decision making may occur even when the prosecutor
has not invited this involvement nor wishes to be burdened by the
knowledge of the victim's perspective. 39 Also, like a client, a crime
victim may attempt to exercise control over the case when, after losing
interest, being inconvenienced, or becoming reconciled with, or intim-
idated by, the defendant, she decides to drop the charges, often
against the prosecutor's advice, and in contradiction to the prosecu-
tor's objective to convict. 40
39 The victims' rights movement argues for greater ownership of the case by the victim.
Victims' rights advocates essentially challenge the current balance of defendants and vic-
tims' rights by conceiving of the prosecutor as the representative of victims only, eliminat-
ing obligations to protect defendants. Of course, these developments are controversial, in
part due to their redefinition of the role of the victim in the arena of public prosecutions.
See generally Cardenas, supra note 29 (arguing that historical and comparative law justifi-
cations give crime victim some participation in prosecution as a private party); Robert P.
Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle
in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1997) (discussing proposed Victim's Rights
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution); see also A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to
Establish a Bill of Rights for Crime Victims: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary
on S.52, 10th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
40 Even though the prosecutor technically acts for the public welfare, generally, a vic-
tim's disinterest in further proceedings signals the end of the case for several reasons.
First, it may be impossible to prove the essential crime elements. Also, the victim's dis-
interest is a disincentive to a prosecutor balancing resources and heavy caseloads. Social
justice goals can be sacrificed in the face of such practical concerns. The relatively recent
development of "no-drop" policies in domestic violence cases that allow the prosecutor to
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Most of the time, however, the prosecutor has exclusive control
over all aspects of a case, operating with a degree of autonomy
unimaginable in a client-based relationship. Prosecutors also have
tools that further differentiate them from the typical attorney-client
relationship.41  If the victim attempts to disengage from the case
against the will of the prosecutor, prosecutors have at their disposal an
arsenal of motivational tools and coercive weapons such as contempt
citations42 or custody pursuant to a material witness order,4 3 that most
lawyers do not possess and would not dream of imposing on their
clients. Imagine a chapter in a client-centered counseling text on how
to motivate a client to make a decision by threatening contempt or
arrest!
In the congested urban criminal justice system with which I am
most familiar, the prosecutor often has little contact with the crime
victim, delegating information gathering to police, paralegals, or more
junior ADAs. Case processing can resemble an assembly line, but one
without much oversight and quality control. In many prosecutors' of-
fices, there is little case handling continuity particularly when a prose-
cution is structured horizontally so that the arrest, indictment, plea
negotiation and final stages are handled by ADAs assigned to the par-
ticular bureaus through which a case passed before its final resolution
(i.e. complaint room, lower court, grand jury, superior trial court). At
the early stages of a case, before any decisions about the direction of
the prosecution have been made, the ADA who eventually will handle
the trial and the plea negotiations has not even been assigned. Given
this discontinuity and disconnectedness, it is easy to see how a prose-
cutor can enter a plea bargain or even dismiss a case without the com-
plainant's knowledge, input, or acquiescence.4 4 In the absence of a
relationship of trust and collaboration, it is also not surprising that the
victim might loose commitment to the case, particularly after the typi-
cal adjournments and delays, resulting in a dismissal or a dispropor-
tionately low guilty plea.45 Alternatively, the prosecutor might be
compel the victim to testify or to proceed with other witnesses is a response to the psycho-
logical ambivalence of victims of these crimes. See Hanna, supra note 11; Angela Corsil-
les, supra note 11.
41 James E. Lobsenz, Prosecutorial Management & the Uncooperative Crime Victim, 15
CRIM. L. BULL. 301, 311-17 (1979) (suggesting strategies to ease victim fears and to over-
come inconvenience).
42 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1826.
43 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW Art. 620 (McKinney 1984).
44 Cardenas, supra note 29, at 388.
45 One study found that victims who became more involved in assisting the prosecutor
prepare the case are less likely to be dissatisfied with the administration of justice even in
the face of delay and expense. Richard D. Knudten et al., The Victim in the Administration
of Criminal Justice: Problems and Perceptions, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE VICIM 119
[Vol. 5:1
Prosecutors as "Counselors"
compelled to use, or threaten to use, coercive means to assure the
victim's cooperation against her will.
Because this association is so one-sided and so unsuited to
achieve the usual empowerment goals of the client-centered attorney-
client relationship, the lessons found in counseling texts have only lim-
ited relevance to students or fledgling prosecutors even for one in-
clined to question, motivate, understand, empathize with, and advise
victims. If the victim is credible and sympathetic, the prosecutor, re-
lieved to have a pliant and cooperative witness, probably shifts into a
combative mode, more preoccupied with the quest for a conviction
than eliciting or addressing the victim's own more layered and subtle
goals. In less clear-cut cases, the prosecutor's attitude is largely deter-
mined by resources. Overburdened prosecutors do not want to invest
time and energy in preparing or trying a case when the conviction is
less certain, even if the trial furnishes the victim with the desired op-
portunity to be center stage regardless of the outcome.
ADAs are assigned staggering numbers of cases so they quickly
learn some efficiency techniques, many of which sacrifice victim in-
volvement. Even in a case in which there is a civilian complainant, it
is more practical to listen to the hearsay version of the crime from the
police officer, to enlist the assistance of a victim services representa-
tive to intervene, and to postpone actual victim contact until the case
has progressed to the trial preparation stage. After a while, losing
contact with the victim becomes habit, making victim-centered coun-
seling a challenge that few prosecutors have the time or inclination to
undertake. Given the high disposition rate by negotiated plea, most
victims never participate in the post-arrest stages of the adjudication
process.
When I was running training programs for entry level ADAs,46 I
tried to import models from clinical education to teach a victim-cen-
tered approach to working with crime victims. Unfortunately, my ef-
forts fit awkwardly with both office practices and the prevailing
understanding of the prosecutorial role. As soon as the recently grad-
uated, neophyte ADAs begin to conduct their own interviews, to han-
dle their own cases, and to respond to the pressures of the job, the
quasi-client-centered counseling model collapses. I confess, therefore,
to a naivet6 about the nature of being a prosecutor and the deep influ-
ence of the socialization process of becoming a prosecutor. Within
their first year in the office, my former clinic students undoubtedly
(William F. McDonald ed. 1976).
46 I served as Director of Training in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office from
1983-1986. My early years of practice, however, were on the defense side so I never exper-
ienced personally learning about prosecution from the ground up.
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consider my advice hopelessly idealistic, unrealistic, and impractical
- if they remember it at all.
C. The Moral Prosecutor
None of the models of collaborative counseling and decision
making are directly relevant to the work of the prosecutor. Yet these
lawyers make daily decisions that profoundly affect the psychological
welfare of crime victims, and that resolve without recourse or account-
ability any emotional and moral claims the victim may have on the
criminal justice system or the, defendant. 47 In so doing, the prosecu-
tors communicate information and relate to victims from a very differ-
ent posture than do other lawyers with their clients.
Admittedly, prosecution is not an easy job, but all of this power
and control inevitably is transformative. 48 The fledgling ADA learns
judgment and evaluative skills, and simultaneously embraces the au-
thoritarian role of decision maker. I reviewed some literature con-
cerned with moral lawyering, to try to determine what model of
lawyer the prosecutor most resembles, or whether this lawyering is sui
generis. I found two plausible referents. First, prosecutors epitomize
William Simon's "discretionary lawyer" who considers broader social
needs in an effort to "promote justice. ' 49 After all, discretion is the
heart and the sinew of prosecution.50 Indeed, Simon cites the public
prosecutor as an inspiration for his discretionary approach. 5 1 It may
belabor the obvious to observe how often prosecutors claim to make
decisions "in the interests of justice" instead of a narrower, restrictive
basis.
Second, I was struck how aptly a synthesis of the "godfather" and
47 In New York City, on any given day, there are close to 2,000 lawyers prosecuting
cases in the state courts of five counties. Many of them are no more than three years out of
law school. If my own experience is representative, no one seriously teaches them how to
relate to crime victims. This is not to suggest that all or even most ADAs are insensitive,
abusive, or callous in their treatment of crime victims. However, the very nature of their
authority, their power, and their ability to control often makes this relationship invisible
and beyond critique. Moreover, since young prosecutors usually learn their styles and atti-
tudes from more senior role models in the office who have internalized this power, bad
habits often are passed along to the next generation.
48 It is impossible to deny that occasionally this transformation can be negative given
the range of activities collectively labeled "prosecutorial misconduct." Prosecutors act im-
properly when they withhold evidence, knowingly rely on perjured testimony, engage in
racism at jury selection, or vindictive prosecution, to name only a few grounds. See gener-
ally, BENNETr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCr (1986); Lawless, supra note
26.
49 William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988)
50 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM.
J. COMP. L. 532 (1970).
51 Simon, supra 49,. at 1091. Simon advocates a discretionary justice model or client-
based lawyering so he does not discuss prosecutors more fully.
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the "guru" approaches described by Shaffer and Cochran in their ty-
pology of lawyer models52 applies to the prosecutors I have taught and
trained. It is easy to see the prosecutor as godfather. The godfather-
prosecutor is both a technician and a parent, using legal skills to
achieve what the lawyer perceives are the best interests of the client
without much, if any, respect for the client's autonomy. 53 The godfa-
ther-prosecutor makes all of the moral choices in the case both on
behalf of society and the victim (e.g., the decision to seek punishment,
the exercise of leniency in a plea recommendation). Like godfathers,
prosecutors are authoritarian, even when cloaked with benign motives
or even genuine kindness and sensitivity.
Given the multiple missions of the prosecutor, however, there is a
substantial amount of guru mixed in with every godfather. According
to Shaffer and Cochran, the client specifically entrusts the guru to
make the correct moral choice on behalf of the client, with some
broader consideration of general welfare in mind.54 Although deci-
sion making control is retained by the lawyer who again knows what is
legally best, this approach comprehends more than the client's narrow
interests. The guru also decides what is morally correct. The guru-
prosecutor is more than the victim's guardian. He or she protects the
integrity of the legal system, the welfare of the community, and the
legal rights of the defendant.
The continual balancing of interests in which prosecutors engage
while exercising discretion - what is fair to the victim, to the defen-
dant, to society in charging, plea negotiation, and sentencing decisions
- adds more than a touch of the guru to the godfather-prosecutor.
Guru-prosecutors play the conventional role of gathering and analyz-
ing information, and then presenting it to the fact-finder. Less visibly,
but within the bounds of their considerable discretion, they also per-
form decision making roles that we normally associate with the police,
the judge, and even the legislature. A decision to decline to charge
"in the interests of justice" even when there is sufficient evidence to
believe that the defendant committed the crime is tantamount to
decriminalizing, usually a legislative preserve. When the ADA impar-
tially examines the evidence bearing in mind the prosecutor's multiple
obligations to several values (e.g., truth and justice, upholding law), he
or she performs a quasi-judicial function. When the selection of par-
ticular charges restricts the sentencing range available to the judge,
the prosecutor intrudes on the traditional province of the judiciary.
52 THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3-14 (1994).
53 Id. at 9.
54 Id. at 31-32.
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The guru-prosecutor mediates the application of the broad terms of
the law taking into account the individual circumstances of the defen-
dant certainly and the interests of the victim occasionally.
In carrying out their duties, prosecutors play certain roles with
respect to the other participants in the system. The outraged query
"How can you defend these people?" 55 comes from the prosecutor
who sees herself a "defender of justice," a self-image which may lead
to the injection of a large dose of personal morality and self-righteous-
ness into the mix. Prosecutors see themselves as "guardians" or "pro-
tectors" of the welfare of the victims and the public. When protecting
what they perceive and represent to be the interests of the victim,
prosecutors often engage in objectionable condescension, making de-
cisions on behalf of, and without consultation with, the victim that are
in the victim's best interest solely in the opinion of the prosecutor.
Some prosecutors see themselves as "problem-solvers" in some cases,
insisting on certain conditions such as restitution, drug treatment pro-
grams, community service without any follow-up to ascertain if the
solutions worked. Despite their differences, the "defender of justice,"
the "guardian," and the "problem-solver" are each variations on the
theme of "godfather-guru," and often pay no more than lip service to
the real needs and concerns of the victim.
Certain attributes of the criminal justice system reinforce the
godfather-guru typology. First, there is no external pressure by judges
to include victims in the decision making process. While this tradi-
tionally enables the prosecutor to act impartially, the exclusion of the
victim has become so routine that the victim virtually vanishes after
the arrest. Indeed, judges presumably accept the notion that the vic-
tim's case is public property and can be adjudicated without any vic-
tim participation. In the large metropolitan prosecutor's office that is
my frame of reference, individual assistant district attorneys rarely
have contact with the victim in connection with the charging decision,
relying instead on the hearsay report of the police. Indeed, in many
states as well as in the federal system, the initial accusatory instrument
can be based on hearsay. 56 Subsequent contacts with the victim may
take place on the phone, and may be conducted by designees from
victim service agencies or by paralegals. The victim might speak to an
assistant district attorney prior to testifying in the grand jury, but
many states do not require an indictment, or following the federal sys-
tem, permit hearsay testimony in the grand jury.57 If the case is dis-
55 JAMES SIMON KUNEN, How CAN You DEFEND THESE PEOPLE? (1983).
56 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. § 100.15 (McKinney 1984); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.
57 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (permitting federal grand jury indict-
ment based solely on hearsay evidence). A majority of states follow Costello. WAYNE R.
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posed of by a guilty plea, the victim may never participate in the
process at all. In a plea bargained case, the prosecutor responsible for
the guilty plea, negotiation and sentencing recommendation may have
never seen or spoken to the victim in person.
Lack of continuity is also a big problem. A victim may speak to
several people - police, different ADAs, victim services representa-
tives and counselors, probation officers - without ever knowing a
name or having a good understanding of who each person is. Obvi-
ously, this is not true for all cases, particularly major crimes, but it is
true enough in the mundane prosecution, even for serious charges
such as assault, robbery, or rape.58
Most victims' rights reform proposals focus on efforts to secure
more inclusion, consultation, and communication, and, in some, the
right to be heard in court at various proceedings. 59 None go so far as
to give victims the right to approve or veto a disposition or sentence.
The absence of the victim's voice and physical presence can lead to a
depersonalization of the case in the eyes of everyone engaged in the
adjudication process. While individual justice for the defendant pur-
ports to be an accepted value, often the crime and the victim become
prototyped and generalized. In plea negotiations, stereotypes abound.
"A one-witness ID case" telegraphs that the case must be weak since
proof of the case will hinge on highly impeachable testimony. If the
victim is imperfect, with a criminal record, for example, the case is
devalued regardless of the strength of the evidence. The prosecutor
objectifies the crime by omitting all facts about the events and the
victim, saying no more than "this is a C felony" in order to communi-
cate a plea offer. The details of who was harmed, and how badly, are
omitted from this bare-bones outline.
Both the discretionary lawyer-prosecutor and the godfather/guru-
prosecutor function in a universe almost free from specific formal eth-
ical oversight of victim relations. There are surprisingly few allusions
to the duties of the office of the prosecutor to victims interspersed
throughout the obvious sources. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct devote an entire section to the special responsibilities of a
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 714-15 (2d ed. 1992).
58 There have been vast changes in the prosecution of sex crimes and domestic violence
cases. Many offices have specialized bureaus so that closer victim contact is more the
norm. While victims of sexual and family violence certainly deserve this attention, other
victims are just as entitled to attentive treatment.
59 For example, the National District Attorney's Association guidelines, require when-
ever feasible that the victim be informed of all stages of the criminal proceedings and
should explain all decisions. NATIONAL DISTRIcr ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, supra note
32, at §§ 26.1-26.2. One recent version of a proposed Victims' Rights Amendment in-
cluded the right to be heard and submit a statement regarding the defendant's release, a
negotiated guilty plea, and the sentence. S. J. Res. 6, 105" Cong., 1"t Sess. (1997).
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prosecutor in which no mention is made of victims, or even witnesses
generally.60 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility counte-
nances the usurpation of decision making by the prosecutor in some
circumstances. The Code states that "during trial the prosecutor is not
only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by
an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be
fair to all."' 61 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution
Function and Defense Function, where one might expect to find a
more explicit reference to the obligations of a prosecutor to a crime
victim, merely recommend that the victim be given "timely notice" of
judicial proceedings, dispositions, and the defendant's release from
custody. 62 The National Prosecution Standards, written by prosecu-
tors but which have no binding authority, aspire to be more inclusive
by urging more communication, clearer explanation, and greater
assistance for victims. 63
All of these forces combine to perpetuate the traditional form of
decision making in which the prosecutor assumes many noble roles:
gatekeeper protecting the defendant from false accusation or unprov-
able charges; conservator of the law and the criminal justice system;
representative of the community; and defender of justice. In addition
to these metaphoric roles, the prosecutor also undertakes to act as a
benevolent guardian who, like other legal guardians, makes decisions,
enters into agreements, and speaks for the interests of the victim. Un-
like other legal guardians, however, the prosecutor has no legal re-
sponsibility or accountability to the victim for these decisions. It is no
wonder that many victims feel mistreated, ignored, or silenced by
their godfather-guru.
D. The "Typical" Victim
There is, of course, no single type of crime victim. 64 There are,
however, several factors that contribute to shaping the relationship
between the prosecutor and the victim. These include the severity of
the harm to the victim, (i.e., the seriousness of the crime); the quality
60 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (amended 1996).
61 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981).
62 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.2(g) (3d ed. 1992). Taking a pragmatic position, the commentary
urges prosecutors to address victims' concerns in order to insure cooperation and com-
mitment.
63 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN-
DARDS, Relations with Witnesses §§ 27.1 - 27.5 (2d ed. 1991).
64 Social science research about the characteristics, treatment, behavior and attitudes of
victims has evolved over the past twenty years. See e.g., VICTIMS OF CRIME AND THE VIC-
TIMIZATION PROCESS (Marilyn McShane & Frank P. Williams, III eds., 1997); CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM (William F. McDonald ed. 1976).
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of the victim as a witness (i.e., opportunity to observe events, ability to
communicate those observations, cooperativeness, lack of undesirable
qualities such as a criminal record); and the expectations about, and
attitude of, the victim toward the criminal process. These factors in-
fluence both the prosecutor's enthusiasm about the case and behavior
toward the particular person.
Like clients generally, most victims cede control to their "law-
yer," acquiescing to decision making by the authoritarian prosecutor-
ial figure because they have no choice if they want their interests
vindicated. This surrender has costs. First, there is the predictable
"out-of-sight, out-of-mind" consequence when the prosecutor has no
reason to contact and communicate with the victim. An arm's length
victim's plight becomes less compelling and less individualized as time
blurs whatever connection the prosecutor may have had to the victim
and adds more victims to the case load. Also, when victims abdicate
control, they also relinquish other valued qualities of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship such as autonomy, confidentiality, and privacy. Crime
victims lack the power that civil clients theoretically have to reap-
propriate the control they have ceded. While the Model Rules require
disclosure to a client about the status of the case and explanations
sufficient to allow the client to make informed choices, 65 victims re-
ceive no such concessions. Victims also cannot assert control over
what is disclosed about them in conversation with defense counsel or
the judge. Since there is no attorney-client privilege, nothing revealed
by the victim to the prosecutor is confidential - a lack of privacy that
exposes the victim's story and interests to an audience of strangers.
Indeed, most prosecutors freely disclose facts and feelings disclosed
by victims to the judge and defense attorney to advance plea nego-
tiations.
When the victim is complicit in this abdication and the prosecutor
assumes sole responsibility for seeking justice on behalf of the abstract
client, the virtual divorce of victim from process can have deleterious
effects on the very ability to prosecute. As time goes on without any
active involvement or connection to the prosecution, victims loose in-
terest, or become disheartened and cynical. They lose their proprie-
tary interest in both the process and the outcome of the case. Victims
also loose faith that the process has the capacity to achieve personal
justice for them when they are so alienated from the day-to-day dev-
elopments.
Too often, however, prosecutors with little personal contact with
the victim reduce the particular circumstances of a case to stock sto-
65 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT' Rule 1.4 (amended 1996).
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ries, creating short-hand descriptions for crimes such as "subway chain
snatch," "push-in robbery," "home invasion," "buy and bust" or "date
rape." There might even be short-hand phrases that reflect a con-
clusory assessment of the evidentiary weaknesses of the case such as
"drug deal gone bad," 66 or "Galbo"67 that lead to a "blow out. '68
Some scholars, including clinicians, recently have begun to ex-
plore schema, narratives and other aspects of cognitive theory as a
form of fact organization to enrich an understanding of the meaning
of events. 69 Ironically, for years prosecutors have used a shorthand
exemplified by the phrases above to communicate with each other
about the nature of the case, including the qualities of the victim. This
tendency to stereotype can have negative rather than helpful results.
First, the case is compartmentalized and denied its particularity.
Rather than elucidating and contextualizing, the stock story shuts off
the prosecutor's openness to the individual victim's story. The ab-
sence of the victim's voice and physical presence pigeon holes the in-
dividual crime into one of these recognizable categories. To most
prosecutors, the millions of stories in the Naked City boil down to
only a handful of plot lines such as "who did it?", "what happened?",
or "did he mean to do it?" This tendency to prototype cases extends
from the charging decision to the courtroom where plea bargaining
occurs. The defendant is being prosecuted for what most people do
when they commit the specific crime charged. Such generalizations
are already taken into account by statutory classifications based on
the manner in which the crime is committed, or, in some instances, on
the status of the victim, and in the sentencing structure. As deperson-
alizing devices, they serve no justifiable purpose except to facilitate
the prosecutor's job.
The central argument against victim inclusion in the decision
making process emanates from the separation of the personal from
the public aspects of the prosecutorial role, and from an emphasis on
deterrence and incapacitation rather than on retribution and restitu-
tion. First, it is claimed the prosecutor would be the instrument of the
66 This describes a robbery between drug dealers suggesting an obvious weakness in the
credibility of the victim.
67 People v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283 (1916) (establishing a legal standard for proving
through circumstantial evidence knowing possession of stolen property).
68 This is a signal to dismiss, i.e., "bad case... dump it."
69 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Argu-
ments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. REV. 55 (1992); Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Law-
yering Expertise, Cognitive Science and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL Eouc. 313
(1995); Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 273 (1989); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Neces-
sity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative
Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681 (1994).
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victim's vengeance if he or she acts as the victim's agent as a regular
client's attorney does. Although not every victim is vengeful or desir-
ous of the most punitive outcome, and some demonstrate remarkable
compassion and forgiveness, the very nature of a victim's experience
can produce highly emotional, often irrational responses which can be
mollified appropriately by prosecution intervention. Prosecutors sup-
posedly bring a non-arbitrary, comparative, universal perspective to
the processing of a case, avoiding issues of emotion or revenge.
To continue the argument, if the victim's interests were the only
ones to be taken into account, larger moral objectives might be unat-
tainable. For example, sometimes the law's effects are unconscionably
harsh or irrational so that prosecutorial discretion correct an unfair
result. An outraged response to a defendant "getting off on a techni-
cality" reflects a lay perspective that, if allowed to dominate, could
eviscerate such remedies as the exclusionary rule, reversal due to pro-
cedural improprieties at trial, or dismissal on legal grounds.
Finally, not all crimes are the same but the damaged victim may
be unwilling to acknowledge any such discriminations. The equilib-
rium between the victim's interest and those of the public shifts de-
pending on the nature of the crime and the special characteristics of
the victim. Criminal statutes traditionally grade offenses on the basis
of the manner of the commission of the crime, the amount of harm
caused, and the type of victim. 70 Prosecutors resort to similar criteria
to make discriminations between cases even where the changes are
identical.
Until now, I have used the term victim generically to include any
civilian crime victim, an oversimplification that fails to account for the
diversity of interactions that different kinds of victims might have with
the prosecutor. Prosecutors also consider a victim's attitude and tem-
perament when evaluating the strength of a case, even if they do not
pay particular attention to the victim's interests and goals. Such fac-
tors might include cooperation (i.e., availability, interest in the case);
ability to communicate (i.e., telling a coherent story), credibility (i.e.,
consistency, motive to lie); and vulnerability (i.e., age, disability).
70 These observations are, of course, generalizations for which exceptions exist, but
glance at the base offense levels set forth in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should
confirm this impression. For example, the base offense level for larceny is 4, U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1 and for burglary of a dwelling 17, U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1. In contrast, the base offense
level for robbery is 20, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 and criminal sexual abuse is 27, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1.
Victim related adjustments appear in U.S.S.G. §§ 3Al.1 - 3A1.4.
Of course, the criminal history of the defendant will be taken into consideration in the
plea bargaining and sentencing stage, although it should not enter into the charging deci-
sion which supposedly only focuses on the sufficiency of the probable cause and the
evidence.
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Another criterion for distinguishing between victims is the quality
of the available evidence. In a case in which there is less likelihood of
conviction due to a variety of factors having nothing to do with the
victim (e.g., a strong defense case or a sympathetic defendant, weak
forensics), the prosecutor may treat the case more leniently in charge
or plea bargaining after an assessment of the likelihood of conviction.
In The Accused, the prosecutor offered a very low plea to the college
student defendant charged with rape who came from a respectable
family. On the other hand, even if the crime is serious and the evi-
dence strong, the prosecutor may feel some bias against a victim who
has liabilities such as a prior criminal record or a history of substance.
abuse. This is the situation both in Criminal Justice where the victim
of a brutal assault appeared to be, although never admitted to being, a
prostitute and/or a crack user, and in The Accused where the rape
victim was characterized as "asking for it."
When a victim is reluctant or recalcitrant and the case would be
difficult or impossible to prove without the victim's participation, the
prosecutor has two choices: motivate the alienated witness or devalue
the case even to the point of dismissal.71 Motivation in the
prosecutorial context can appeal to the altruistic (e.g., "Save other
people from being hurt by this defendant."), to the psychological (e.g.,
"You'll feel better with closure knowing that you saw it through."), or
to the material (e.g., "The only way you'll get restitution is if you co-
operate."). Motivation also can be quite coercive. Prosecutors can
use subpoenas, contempt orders, obstruction charges, or material wit-
ness arrest warrants to compel a witness to testify. Most of these rem-
edies are reserved for the most serious cases so that normally the
uncooperativeness of a victim will signal the end of a case, whether by
dismissal or guilty plea to a lesser offense. If the prosecutor believes
the defendant committed the crime, even if the victim disengages,
convictions may still occur in through a charge bargain. Unfortu-
nately, prosecutors often fail to grasp the obvious: early contact, fre-
quent communication, and consultation might have avoided the
alienation in the first instance.
On the other hand, many victims are emotionally involved in
their cases. Overworked prosecutors who have to respond to these
feelings rarely are trained in psychology or interpersonal sensitivity so
they are discomforted by the intense feelings of some victims and can-
not sensitively or effectively respond. Most victims have a legitimate
71 In New York State, a prosecutor can negotiate and recommend acceptance of a
guilty plea while withholding information that the victim will not be available to testify at
trial without violating the defendant's due process rights or committing an ethical trans-
gression. -People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76 (1978).
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claim to their passions and grievances. Having been wronged or
harmed in some way by the victim, they want to avoid being abused a
second time by the system. Sometimes an emotionally demanding vic-
tim may begin to feel like a burden to the prosecutor, and even cause
some speculation about the victim's motives or credibility, thereby un-
dermining the prosecutor's commitment to the case.
Finally, there are some victims who simply do not impress the
prosecutor for a variety of subjective reasons, resulting in some bias
against the case. The victim may have some imperfections, such as a
criminal record or a substance abuse problem, which alienate the
prosecutor. Often the victim comes from a vastly different back-
ground than the prosecutor who typically has little inclination or in-
centive to learn about these differences. 72 Indeed, crime victims in
urban areas may feel just as alienated from the criminal justice system
as the defendant. In many respects, they deserve to feel even more
disaffected since not only does the defendant usually have a zealous
advocate, but also the legal system is dedicated to protecting the de-
fendant's constitutional and procedural rights. In contrast, the victim
has no equivalent champion. In the normal attorney-client relation-
ship, personality and attitudinal differences create a host of problems
to resolve, or at least attempt to resolve, in order to provide effective
representation. The prosecutor does not have any particular incentive
to reconcile those differences. As a result, a host of negative subjec-
tive impressions about the victim may cause the prosecutor to take a
particular position on the case having more to do with the subjectivity
of the individual prosecutor than with the wishes of the victim or the
seriousness of the crime.
If these descriptions sound like stereotypes, implying that certain
types of people receive different treatment by the prosecutor, then I
have made my point. Prosecutors offer many rationalizations for their
judgmental or neglectful attitudes such as excessive case load, staff
turnover, or the stress of trial work. While their explanations might
contain some truth, they also are attributable to indifference to the
victim coupled with an investment in controlling cases and winning
trials.
Given all of the philosophical, institutional, and practical justifi-
cations for marginalizing the victim, it is audacious and perhaps pre-
sumptuous to advocate a viable alternative vision of the relationship
of prosecutors to crime victims that will preserve their objectivity and
their obligation to an ethos of fairness and justice. Despite the en-
72 Ellen Yaroshefsky observed controversially that: "We should recognize...that vic-
tims and defendants have more in common with one another than either of them have with
lawyers, whether prosecution or defense." Yaroshefsky, supra note 34, at 166.
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trenched behavior situating control over all decisions in the hands of
the prosecutor, there some adjustments have to occur in order to re-
duce victim alienation from, and increase victim satisfaction with, the
criminal justice system.
III. SOME STEPS TOWARD VICTIM-CENTERED "COUNSELING" BY
PROSECUTORS
Victim right's advocates espouse an increased role for crime vic-
tims in various stages of the criminal process through communication,
consultation, participation, and even representation by independent
counsel. These changes would afford victims more visibility, dignity,
and a sense of proprietorship of their own experiences. Any reforms
along these lines will alter the traditional dynamic of prosecutor-vic-
tim relations to some degree. Many commentators have recom-
mended measures to increase victim participation and voice,73 but
none have developed the kinds of scripts or protocols found in client
counseling texts.
In the absence of representations of actual victim interactions
with prosecutors, I turned to the movies for fictionalized depiction of
the problems that I know exist in real life. Two movies, The Ac-
cused,74 and Criminal Justice,75 offer vivid examples of failed prosecu-
tor-victim interaction. In the context of some excerpts from the films,
I will identify the flaws in the prosecutor's conduct, most of which are
painfully obvious, pose a preferable model of quasi-counseling, and
then apply it to the circumstances of the films.
73 See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecu-
tion, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 557-58 (1982) (recommending bringing victim into system by mak-
ing victim a party, thus requiring the prosecutor to justify decisions in court); Linda G.
Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 1225 (1996) (developing a theory of 'affective lawyering' which meets clients - in
this article domestic violence survivors - on their own terms and emotions); Stark-
weather, supra note 37, at 876 (recommending: 1) that prosecutors give victims a written
statement describing and justifying plea offer, then consult with victim, and at least take
into account victim's concerns; and 2) that before plea agreement is reached, victim and
defendant meet); Cardenas, supra note 29, at 390-93 (recommending restitutionary model
in which victim becomes a party occupying central role and collapses civil-criminal distinc-
tions); Yaroshefsky, supra note 34 at 145-46 (recommending appointment of counsel for
defendant); Sarah N. Welling, Victims in the Criminal Process: A Utilitarian Analysis of
Victim Participation in the Charging Decision, 30 Amz. L. REV. 85, 114-116 (1988) (recom-
mending a victim's right to consult with the prosecutor);
74 THE ACCUSED (Paramount Pictures 1988).
75 CRIMINAL JUSTICE (HBO 1990).
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A. The Reel World
1. The Accused
In The Accused, Jodie Foster plays Sara Tobias, a victim of gang
rape, who in addition to being hard-living and sexually provocative, is
extremely clear about her victimization and what she wants from the
criminal prosecution of her assailants. The prosecutor, Katherine,
motivated by her legal assessment that a conviction would be impos-
sible given the manner of the commission of the crime and the
background of the victim, takes a plea to a charge of reckless endan-
germent, a non-sex offense. She thinks she has achieved a great result
without risking an acquittal. The middle class defendants, willing to
plead guilty as long as the conviction did not mention a sex crime,
would be punished fairly substantially. This depiction of the prosecu-
tor's thought process accurately captures a recognizable edgy, adver-
sarial perspective.
Before the plea bargain, the movie shows the prosecutor attend-
ing an ice hockey match with two male colleagues. In between cheers
for the game, the dialogue discloses Katherine's doubts about the case
in which she is true to the stereotype of the competitive, egocentric
prosecutor. She expresses concern about Sara's vulnerability on
cross-examination, but her worries have less to do with Sara's feelings
than the potential damage to the case. Ironically, her male colleagues
sound more concerned about the victim's welfare than Katherine, who
is preoccupied with her adversarial stance.
Katherine: Now if I take it to trial, they'll destroy her. She walked in
there alone, she got drunk, she got stoned, she came on
to them, she's got a prior for possession.
ADA #1: That's inadmissible.
Katherine: Sure, it's inadmissible, but they'll ask her about it, I'll
object and the judge will sustain it, but the jury will hear
it. She's a sitting duck.
ADA #1: I read her Q&A, gang rape on a pin ball machine. It's an
ugly case.
Katherine: The question is, is it a winnable case?
DA (her boss): We understand that you love to win but I can't let you
dismiss this because you don't have a lock.
Katherine: A lock! I don't have a case.
The victim learns of the guilty plea for the first time in the news-
paper. Feeling betrayed by both the plea and the absence of commu-
nication, she angrily confronts the prosecutor in a scene in which she
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explodes with furious frustration:
Sara: You double crossing bitch. You sold me out. Did you see
this? Did you see this? This is what you did. I wouldn't be a
good witness! I'm too fragile! My past is too questionable! I'm
a drunk! I'm a pot head! I'm a drug addict! I'm some slut who
got bounced around in some bar! I never got raped!
Katherine: Of course you were raped.
Sara: How come it doesn't say that? How come it doesn't say Sara
Tobias was raped? What the fuck is reckless endangerment?
Katherine: It's a felony that carries the same prison term as rape. You
asked me to put them away and I did.
Sara: Who the hell are you decide that I ain't good enough to be a
witness? I bet if I went to law school and I didn't live in some
god awful dump, I would be good enough.
Katherine: I understand how you feel. I did my best.
Sara: No, you don't understand how I feel. I'm standing there with
my pants down and my crotch hung out for the world to see
and three guys are sticking it to me and a bunch of other guys
are standing there clapping and yelling and you're standing
there telling me that that's the best you can do. If that's the
best you can do then your best sucks. I don't know what you
got for selling me out, but I sure as shit hope it's worth it.
Although the prosecutor had interviewed Sara immediately after
the rape occurred, had seen her battered condition and listened to her
gruesome story of gang rape, she had not heard what Sara was saying
about her feelings concerning the prosecution. Indeed, until this con-
frontation, her dealings with Sara had been cool, distant, and profes-
sional. Katherine had evaluated the facts of the case dispassionately
and appraised the victim from the protection of her professional shell.
Even her male colleagues had questioned her calculating, adversarial
attitude toward the case, recoiling from a decision that seemed to di-
minish the seriousness of the crime.
When Katherine congratulates herself for the conviction, she
clearly is oblivious to Sara's very different needs. No one, least of all
Sara, believes her when Katherine claims, "I understand how you
feel." The viewer, as well as Sara, is angered by this arrogance, since
Katherine so clearly does not understand. Katherine never consid-
ered that Sara might even have preferred an acquittal to invisibility, a
choice which her prosecutorial mentality would reject as illogical.
Sara was willing to risk humiliation on the witness stand for an oppor-
tunity to tell her story and confront her attackers. Katherine had
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never considered that to Sara being included in the decision making
process, and telling her story publicly would be more beneficial than a
conviction and jail sentence that did not reflect the defendant's true
blameworthiness. Eventually, Sara's anger induces a prosecutorial
epiphany, motivating Katherine to investigate other legally innovative
theories to help Sara achieve her goals. In the subsequent trial, both
Sara's need for an opportunity to tell her story with dignity, and
Katherine's desire to convict were fulfilled. More importantly, they
worked collaboratively.
This example of prosecutorial consciousness raising is dramatic
and highly idealized. A more realistic version would stop with the
guilty plea. Most prosecutors look and sound like Katherine and
would agree with her evaluation of the case that the negotiated guilty
plea had reduced the risk of an acquittal, had adequately punished the
defendants, and thus had achieved justice for Sara. Like Katherine,
most prosecutors would never even consider that Sara had different
priorities: the opportunity to tell her story, to confront her assailants,
to be treated with respect, and to be included in the process of deter-
mining what would happen to the men who brutalized her.
2. Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice exposes quite effectively the absence of absolutes
in the criminal justice system. From the outset, the prosecutor, and
the audience, is uncertain whether Denise Moore, the victim of a rob-
bery/assault during which her face was savagely slashed, has correctly
identified the defendant, a sympathetic loser (he is seen carrying Pam-
pers for his child). The police and the prosecutor believe that Denise
may have been using crack on the night of her attack, thus undermin-
ing her ability to observe her assailant, critical in any single-witness
case, and her general credibility. Furthermore, Denise has a criminal
record. She is a flawed, but not necessarily atypical, victim of crime.
When Liz Carter, the ADA assigned to the case meets Denise for
the first time, she is all business, worried about the weaknesses of her
case. During their conversation, she does not refer to Denise's disfig-
uring injury and makes only cursory attempts to bolster Denise's frag-
ile self-confidence. Instead, Liz focuses on the upcoming grand jury
presentation, eventually becoming quite adversarial with the victim.
Riley
(detective): Denise, this is Liz Carter from the District Attorney's office.
Liz: Nice to meet you, Denise. You okay?
Denise: Yeah.
Liz: I know it took a lot of guts to come over here.
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Denise: He ain't gonna be there, is he?
Liz: Jesse Williams (the defendant)? No, I'm sure he won't.
Denise: (looks over at Detective who is shaking his head no).
Liz: Now the Grand Jury is real easy. There will be about 20 peo-
ple in there. I'll ask you some questions. You tell the truth
and they'll indict the creep. Don't worry- you and,I, we're
going to put this guy away for a long time (puts her hand on
Denise's shoulder).
Liz: Denise, did you know that the police went to 229 Kingman
(the scene of the crime) and they couldn't find anyone living
there named Anthony?
Denise: Ahem.
Liz: Do you know 229 is a crack spot?
Denise: Yeah, so? There's a lot of crack spots.
Liz: Denise, have you ever been convicted of a crime?
Denise: No.
Liz: Denise, there are two things I care about. One is putting this
guy away for as long as possible. The other is helping you out
so that you're not destroyed on the witness stand. And I
gotta tell you, you're not being straight with me. I have your
record here and it says for one that you were convicted of
shoplifting on April 19, 1988.
Denise: Yeah, but it wasn't me.
Liz: But Denise, it says here that you plead guilty in criminal
court.
Denise: Yeah, but I didn't do it.
Liz: So, when you were in court that day- in front of a judge-
you were lying, is that it?
Denise: N6.
Liz: And all these other times you plead guilty- prostitution,
drug possession- you were lying to the judge also, is that
true?
Denise: No, see they said take a plea and you'll walk. Right? So I
took one. I didn't want to go to jail. What's the big deal any-
way? I'm not the one on trial here.
Liz: No, but when there is a trial, Jesse's attorney is gonna rake
you over the coals about your record. And, if he can make
you seem like a liar about this or anything else- even what
you had for dinner last night, the jury may not take your
word about who robbed you and slashed your face.
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Denise: Yeah well, I wasn't out buying crack that night, alright?
Liz: Denise, I'm going to be honest with you, okay? Every God
damn case I've tried this year- every God damn one, has
had crack floating around in it somehow. Every robbery is a
drug deal gone bad. Every shooting is a battle over drug turf.
And my gut instinct in this case, my guts is that Jesse needed
money for crack and that you were at 229, maybe trying to
score a little too, and it was the wrong spot at the wrong
time. Does that ring a bell to you?
Denise: God damn it. It doesn't ring a fucking bell with me. Jesse
Williams slashed my face and everybody kept telling me that
I wouldn't have to testify. And now you're telling me that I
may have to testify? Well look, it's my face he slashed,
alright? It's me he's gonna stomp on. And all you're fucking
worried about is if I had crack that night? Fuck you, alright?
Fuck you and fuck this shit.
This should be familiar dialogue to many prosecutors who believe
that they are protecting the victim from devastating cross-examination
and who want to prepare the victim for the attack by demonstrating
how tough it will be on the stand. Under this barrage, most witnesses
react as hostilely and defensively as Denise, and wonder whose side
the prosecutor is on. But Liz is not giving Denise enough credit for
her courage, intelligence and determination. She makes no effort to
treat her as an individual, but instead stereotypes her as part of the
drug scene with all its attendant liabilities.
Before the trial, Liz comes to see Denise at her home. Denise
has been difficult but Liz needs her the next day and has come to be
supportive. How big a stretch this is for the business-like prosecutor is
evident from their conversation:
Liz: Hi Denise. How are you feeling?
Denise: Alright.
Liz: Did Riley feed you?
Denise: Yeah, he gave me some chicken McNuggets.
Liz: Oh good.
Denise: Urn, the guy Williams, is he gonna be there?
Liz: Yeah.
Denise: Oh shit. He's gonna be sitting there and I'm going to have to
point my finger at him and say "You're the one that did it,
right?"
Liz: Denise, you'll be protected.
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Denise: Look, I'm sorry about missing my appointments and all, but you
don't understand what I'm going through.
Liz: I do.
Denise: No, you don't. I mean you can't tell me shit. You got a good job
and you've probably got some cute, rich boyfriend. Yeah, and I
doubt anybody is ever gonna slash your face.
Liz: Denise, I wouldn't be here at 10 o'clock at night if I didn't care
about you. Let's go in your room and talk.
Denise: Okay. Excuse the place - it ain't much. Here, sit down.
Liz: Now, let's talk about tomorrow. When I ask you questions, you
just go through the story step by step.
Denise: I didn't use crack that night.
Liz: Did I ask you that? Denise, you've got to listen to the question
before you answer it- especially when Williams' lawyer is cross-
examining you. If a question calls for a one word answer- yes or
no- just say yes or no. Don't volunteer anything. I guarantee
this lawyer is going to argue with you and he is gonna try to get
under your skin. You can't let him.
Denise: Don't worry.
Liz: Look, this happened 6 months ago so no one is gonna expect you
to remember every detail. Just tell the truth.
Denise: Are they gonna ask me about my record. You know, about the
prostitution and drugs?
Liz: Yes, I'm sure he will.
Denise: Shit.
Liz: And when he does, don't argue with him. Denise, just answer the
questions. Don't forget, you are not the one that is on trial here.
You're the victim. Oh, I almost forgot. I got this number for
you- it's a drug rehab. Do you know the Odyssey House?
They've got a really long waiting list...
Denise: Look, I don't need no drug rehab.
Liz: Well, I called them and they said they'd take you right after trial.
How's that?
Denise: I didn't ask for no favors, alright?
Liz: Just take it, would you.
Denise: (takes the piece of paper)
Liz: So let's go through the story one time from the top.
Denise: No, I've had enough of this shit. I'm tired, okay? I know what
happened. Could you just please go? Would you get out of here?
I just want to be by myself, okay? Please go.
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Liz: See you tomorrow.
Denise: Just go.
This conversation surely represents some progress both in this
particular relationship and in the depiction of prosecutor-victim rela-
tionships generally. Like Katherine, Liz has attempted to use empa-
thy, averring that she 'understands' what Denise is going through. But
even her insincere efforts are wasted on Denise who, like Sara, knows
that the lawyer and victim are irrevocably different. Her references to
the cute, rich boyfriend and the good job echo the scene in Kathe-
rine's apartment when Sara, screechingly out of place, interrupts a
dinner party for Katherine's yuppie friends.
Liz also tries to bolster Denise by reminding her that she is the
victim and not the one on trial. Again, despite Liz's claim that she is
preparing Denise for cross-examination, these reassurances are un-
convincing, particularly after the skepticism Liz has expressed in the
past. Her attempts to remediate are not wholly fruitless because De-
nise does calm down. Finally, Liz reveals her true colors when she
tries to "fix" or "save" Denise by giving her information about a drug
rehabilitation program, when Denise steadfastly denies any drug use.
Liz clearly still does not believe her witness, an attitude that Denise
understands and that explains her resistance to Liz's patronizing offer.
At the trial, tiny Denise courageously enters the courtroom,
ready to testify, much to the consternation of the defendant who, the
audience is meant to believe, had gambled that she would not appear.
Quickly, the defendant hustles for a plea bargain, which Liz negotiates
with the judge and the defense attorney despite Denise's presence in
the courtroom. As the courtroom empties, Denise confronts Liz with
her anger and disillusionment about the plea bargain, and with her
feelings of betrayal:
Denise: Ms. Carter, why the fuck did you make that damn deal? I
wanted to testify.
Liz: Denise, it was a big risk I did not want to subject you to. Jesse's
lawyer was gonna be vicious. And you know juries in Brooklyn.
They'll set anyone free.76
Denise: But you were my lawyer. You were supposed to believe in me.
Liz: Denise, I'm not your personal lawyer. I represent the People of
New York. But, I believed you. We had a chance to put this guy
away for sure and I took it.
76 No, they do not!
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Denise: Look at my scar, Ms. Carter. Look at it (crying). It's not there for
no 3 fucking years. It's there for the rest of my fucking life. I
don't believe this shit man. First, my face gets fucked up by this
fucking bastard and then my head gets fucked up by you and that
stupid judge. The People of New York, my fucking ass. What
about me, huh? Who cares what happens to me? Who the hell
cares if he gets out and slices me up once more, huh?
Liz: Denise, we'll write the parole board. We'll get an order of pro-
tection. You'll be okay. I...
Denise: Okay? I'll never be okay. The scar is forever. Oh, I just swear to
God, I hope that Jesse Williams gets stabbed to death in prison. I
hope they call that piece of shit a bastard so he knows how the
fuck that feels. Look at what he did to me.
Liz: Denise, I made a decision. I honestly believe it was the right
one. I wish we could have put him away for 20 years, but this is
the best we could do. Denise, you still have that drug rehab
number I gave you?
Denise: You still don't get it, do you? (She then runs out of the court
room)
No, Liz did not get it, nor did Katherine, nor do most prosecutors.
The bromide offered by Liz that she was not Denise's personal lawyer
and that she represents the "people," after months of acting other-
wise, shocked Denise into her question: "Who cares what happens to
me?" Momentarily, and against her better judgment, she trusted Liz,
perhaps not wholeheartedly, but sufficiently to have counted on her to
be the instrument of her dignity and visibility.
Both Sara and Denise misunderstood the prosecutor's role and
were abetted in this misperception by the tactics used by Katherine
and Liz to secure their cooperation for as long as the lawyers consid-
ered it important. Neither prosecutor was forthcoming about her
agenda or honest about her relationship to the victim. Undoubtedly,
neither questioned her own behavior, as evidenced by their identical
hollow protests of "I know how you feel."
The two prosecutors have slightly different styles. Cool and dis-
tant Katherine apparently was oblivious to any alternative approach
she might have to Sara and to her prosecutorial role. Her reaction to
Sara's accusations was to take immediate and creative action, using
her talents aggressively. After the trial, the viewer is left with the im-
pression that Sara has taught Katherine a life-altering lesson about
working with and for crime victims. The portrayal of Liz is more accu-
rate, realistically capturing the cynicism of a Brooklyn prosecutor.
Brusque and world weary, Liz has heard it all before, yet she has some
awareness of the need to build a relationship with the victim, to gain
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her trust, to motivate her cooperation, and to assuage her fears. She
does this without much sensitivity or empathy. Liz knows a little bit
about what she should do, but nothing about how to create a genuine
connection with Denise, the individual.
That both ADAs are women is undoubtedly a dramatic device,
even a clich6, intended to enhance the apparent conflict between their
gender and their professionally detached response to the female vic-
tims of male violence. As a result, the viewer is pushed to wonder
even more at the inability of these women to connect. In the case of
The Accused, Katherine is made to feel shame for her careerism until
she redeems herself. In Criminal Justice, the effect of Denise's accusa-
tion is unknown. The film ends ambiguously, leaving the viewer dubi-
ous about whether Liz believes she did achieve "justice," and how this
experience will affect her in the future.
Many prosecutors might scoff at the idea of bringing a defendant
to trial on legally speculative charges just to assuage her conscience as
Katherine did. Yet because she persists even after her boss tells her
that she will be a pariah in the office, many prosecutors who them-
selves might be less courageous might applaud her principled stand.
They also might commend Liz for her more than minimal efforts to
reach out to the victim by visiting her at home and trying to help her
drug problem, and react with surprise at Denise's disillusionment. Af-
ter all, as Liz says, he was convicted and is going to jail.
Whether the best response to the behavior of these prosecutors is
respect or derision, it is likely that most actual prosecutors would han-
dle their victims no better. In fact, both Katherine and Liz tried to be
sensitive, and connect with the victims. They had substantial contacts
with their victims, and listened in an attempt to take their interests
into account, even though their efforts were imperfect. These victims
were neither silent nor invisible, providing much more opportunity for
communication than might be true in the routine real-life case. Nev-
ertheless, these efforts were failures according to both Sara and De-
nise, and flawed in the eyes of the slightly more objective viewer,
ultimately confirming a negative impression of the ability of the crimi-
nal justice system to respond to victim concerns.
B. The Real World
Is change in the non-cinematic world of the urban DA's office
possible? Almost twenty years ago, Abraham Goldstein advocated a
greater voice for the victim by permitting participation in dismissal,
charge reduction, guilty pleas, and sentencing decisions.77 Today, this
77 ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
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voice is still a whisper. To improve, it need not be strident, as some
might characterize the victim's rights agenda, just respected and at-
tended. Any change would ameliorate the conventional prosecutor-
victim relationship.
For domestic violence cases, Linda Mills has proposed a model of
"affective lawyering" in which prosecutors embrace the emotional as-
pects of lawyering rather than remain detached. 78 While domestic vi-
olence victims have unique psychological problems, and similar claims
might be made for rape survivors, the general notion that empathy
and acceptance enhance the victim's confidence, credibility, and faith
in the criminal justice system is so obvious, that any counter-argu-
ments (usually focused on resources and time) seem weak and self-
serving. I propose to reorient the current balance from an approach
that admits a victim to the decision making process only at the suffer-
ance of the prosecutor to a more collaborative model that esteems
communication, consultation and participation.
Unlike a civil client or even a criminal defendant, a crime victim
does not control the destiny of a criminal case. But neither the multi-
dimensional obligations of the prosecutor nor concern about the vin-
dictiveness or irrationality of the victim justify the current typical situ-
ation of exclusion which may result in a victim, like Sara Tobias,
learning about the disposition of her case from the newspapers. Who
other than the victim (or the victim's family and friends) actually has
any interest in its disposition? Certainly, the fictitious "people" have
no measurable stake in the outcome of the individual routine cases
that constitute the majority of matters processed in the criminal jus-
tice system.79 Given this unrivaled claim, it is difficult to justify ex-
cluding a victim who is aware that the prosecutor must serve other
constituencies and, ethically has no obligation to defer to his or her
wishes. 80 Ordinarily, the victim should be informed and consulted
THE GUILTY PLEA 70-73 (1981).
78 Linda G. Mills, supra, note 73.
79 Perhaps in a few instances, usually high publicity cases, other communities might
have an interest and want a voice in the disposition of a case. In these cases, the victim, in
competition with all these other, perhaps more powerful constituencies, is all the more
likely to be discounted or ignored. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMs' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 190-92 (1996), in which the
author describes a case in Brooklyn of a teenager who had been kidnaped by an ultra-
Orthodox rabbi and who, after he had been missing for two years charged, returned to
denounce his parents as irreligious. Although the rabbi was charged with kidnaping, he
was offered a guilty plea that would involve no imprisonment, but only probation and
community service. The boy's parents were not consulted or even informed about this
arrangement. Eventually, the judge, responding to the public denunciation of this plea
from sympathizers of the parents, refused to honor the arrangement.
80 One conventional view of the allocation of lawyer-client decision making authority
draws a line between decisions about the general goals and the final disposition of the case
[Vol. 5:1
Prosecutors as "Counselors"
about the case unless something usual occurs such as a ruling concern-
ing a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in the evidence-
gathering phase or a legal challenge to the charges, that might pro-
duce conflict with the victim's goals. Even then, the prosecutor has
some duty of explanation. Within the acknowledged parameters of
the prosecutor's capacity to defer to the victim, this most closely re-
sembles a collaborative model of lawyer-client relationship in which
the lawyer and client "share responsibility for diagnosis, action and
implementation. "81
There are three victim-centric values that I propose all prosecu-
tors should honor: respect, compassion, and empathy. If a state of
genuine empathy is too difficult to attain, then at least sincere atten-
tiveness. These values can be incorporated into any prosecutor-victim
interaction through explanation, communication, and participation.
The measure of the success of this approach would not be simply vic-
tim satisfaction, an amorphous concept that could as easily describe
vengeance as a comfortable waiting room. Instead, it would be the
victim's and prosecutor's mutual judgment about the quality of the
shared experience. Liz had to convince herself, and failed to convince
Denise, that the plea bargain was a just response to Denise's experi-
ence because the defendant will be serving time. The prosecutor who
can assess the relationship and feel that she listened to and treated the
victim with respect and compassion will not have to seek such reassur-
ance. The dramatic courtroom (and dinner party in The Accused) ac-
cusations would not occur.
With these values as guideposts, there are three stages of the
usual case when victim inclusion could be enhanced: charging, plea
bargaining, and sentencing.
(the ends) and those about tactics and lawyering skills (the means). Robert D. Dinerstein,
supra note 16, at 504; BINDER, et al., supra note 2, at 16-18; see also ABA MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.4 (amended 1996) ("The guiding principle is that the
lawyer should fulfil reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty
to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character
of representation.") There are many decisions about which the victim and prosecutor
might disagree that could be called "technical" rather than "substantive." For example, the
victim might not want a particular witness to testify for the prosecution (a minor child, for
example) or might balk at testifying about past misconduct despite the prosecutor's inten-
tion to mitigate the revelation by bringing out potentially damaging evidence voluntarily
("taking out the sting). The victim, however, might not agree that these decisions are
merely tactical. If the victim's preference might jeopardize the conviction, and if that is an
undesirable outcome to the victim, then deference to the prosecutor's greater expertise is
required.
81 JAMES E. MOLITERNO & JOHN M. LEVY, ETHics OF THE LAWYER'S WoRK 86 (1993).
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1. Charging
The initial charging decision is arguably the most critical moment
in a criminal case and for that reason is the exclusive province of the
prosecutor. 82 The prosecutor's quasi-judicial function, requiring fe-
alty to the law and fairness to the defendant, governs the charging
decision. First, the legal sufficiency of the evidence against the suspect
must be examined objectively and independently. Second, the prose-
cutor relies on the neutral assessment of the arresting officer about
the victim's story. Moreover, victim emotions are strongest immedi-
ately after the crime or the arrest so that the level of victim subjectiv-
ity is most potent, and expectations most unrealistic. A cooling-off
period might help set the case on a more reasoned course. Finally,
once a probable cause determination has been made, pressure to pro-
cess the case expeditiously following the arrest militates against any
in-depth probing with the victim.
In most jurisdictions, procedural rules require some kind of
screening proceeding, such as a preliminary hearing or a grand jury
presentation, at which the victim testifies following the arrest and
charge. This is an opportunity for the prosecutor to begin the process
of explanation and consultation. Usually, the preparation for these
proceedings focuses on the facts rather than on the victim's goals or
the prosecutor's long-range intentions. Since most cases in the crimi-
nal justice system are destined for a negotiated guilty plea rather than
trial, this may be the first and only occasion for the prosecutor to dis-
cuss the process and possible resolution of the case. The success of
these discussions as victim-centered lawyering depends on the com-
mitment of the prosecutor to listen to and respect the victim's point of
view.
This initial meeting, and any follow-up sessions, should include:
a. An express discussion of the realities of the apportionment
of power in the decision making process.
From the outset, the victim must be made to understand the myr-
iad duties of the prosecutor, including some loyalty to the defendant,
or else she will make Denise's mistake of thinking the ADA is the
victim's lawyer. Furthermore, the prosecutor should educate the vic-
82 Most courts refuse to intervene in the prosecutor's decision to decline to charge, see,
e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("a citizen lacks standing to contest
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor
threatened with prosecution"); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973); but see Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inac-
tion: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 503 (1988) (proposing a
statute that would enable a victim to seek a declaratory judgment that the prosecutor's
failure to charge is an abuse of discretion).
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tim about the legal constraints on the prosecutor's decisions.
If Katherine initially had paid attention to Sara, she would have
heard about concerns that were more personal, but not necessarily
incompatible with her own conviction-oriented goals. If she had taken
seriously Sara's interests Katherine might have: 1) not taken a guilty
plea at all; 2) insisted on a plea to a sex offense; 3) laid out the costs of
testifying so that Sara understood the risk; and 4) explained convinc-
ingly why the guilty plea was the best vehicle to achieve Sara's goals
despite her skepticism. Furthermore, if either Katherine or Liz had
explained the realities of the system in which the vast majority of
cases result in non-trial dispositions, neither Sara nor Denise would
have counted so heavily on a trial for their empowerment.
b. A clear explanation of the impending proceedings.
The victim should understand the nature of any proceedings at
which she must appear, and a summary of the nature of any proceed-
ings from which the victim is likely to be absent. In addition, she
should know other significant information such as an estimate of the
case's duration, and, if possible a prediction about the probability of a
negotiated guilty plea. At this time, the prosecutor could discuss evi-
dentiary or procedural problems in order to lay the groundwork for
more thorough explanations should the need arise in the future. This
discussion also could elicit from the victim the degree to which she
wants to be consulted or to participate.
c. A clear message to the victim that any disclosures are not
confidential as a matter of law.
As early as this first conversation, the prosecutor should dispel
any misconception that the victim has an expectation of privacy or
confidentiality, but should do so in a manner designed to avoid inhib-
iting the victim's candor.
2. Plea Negotiations
Unless the prosecutor plans to negotiate purely on the basis of
the crime charged and the defendant's record, detailed and accurate
information is imperative. The best source of this information is the
victim, but when discussing the facts that might be the basis of testi-
mony or prompt additional investigation, the conversation should be
reciprocal. Prosecutors, for both sensible and self-protective reasons,
rarely divulge their evaluative thought process to the victim. Cer-
tainly, there may be legal issues that would be difficult to explain or
factors that would be embarrassing to disclose (e.g., the loss of evi-
dence, or a personal opinion that the victim would be an inarticulate
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witness), but none of these reasons justifies withholding information
from the victim. Moreover, prosecutors tend to look at the bottom
line relating to the degree of the conviction and the sentence imposed
rather than intermediate or alternative possibilities. In both The Ac-
cused and Criminal Justice, the knowledge that the defendants had
admitted guilt and were going to jail did not appease their victims.
Without any real discussion, both Katherine and Liz incorrectly pre-
sumed reticence to testify on the part of their respective witness, and
thus predicated a plea offer on an effort to spare the victim this un-
pleasantness. As both Sara and Denise demonstrated, prosecutors
can misjudge this easily.
Plea negotiations can be, but rarely are, a single moment in time.
Usually it is an extended process of offer, counter-offer, and delibera-
tion which comprehends the entire pretrial life of a case. During this
period, a case might appear on the court calendar many times without
any participation by or contact with the victim. Left in the dark, many
times victims are unaware of periodic legal developments, such as pre-
trial motions, or changed circumstances, such as the defendant's re-
lease or a new arrest. In an extreme version of this isolation, the
victim may not even be informed when the defendant does plead
guilty. If communication with the victim regularly has been delegated
to others, such as paralegals or victim liaison personnel, who do not
know the details and reasons behind the decision, the victim may
know only the fact of the guilty plea but none of the underlying
justifications.
At the early stages of the case, the prosecutor and victim should
come to an agreement about the frequency and nature of their con-
tacts during the pendency of the case. 83 Of course, if a victim initiates
contact, a courteous and professional prosecutor should respond.
When the burden falls on the prosecutor to decide how often and why
to contact the victim, a preestablished understanding of the issues that
will call for communication should avert unrealized expectations,
alienation, and disaffection. Finally, better communication signals re-
spect and compassion and should avoid the bitter personal feelings of
betrayal expressed by a Sara or a Denise.
3. Sentencing
Victims' voices have been heard loudest at sentencing, although
not without controversy. 84 In the closing chapter, the judge, rather
83 This understanding resembles the collaborative relationship reached after a negotia-
tion of its terms advocated in Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BuFF. L. REV. 71, 83-84 (1996).
84 See note 17 supra.
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than the prosecutor, is the audience with which the victim wants to
communicate. This job of facilitating an expression of a victim's feel-
ings should be straightforward because, by this point, the prosecutor
should have an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the vic-
tim's interests if the relationship until that point has embodied the
recommended values. At sentencing after a guilty plea, the range of
possibilities usually has been so predetermined, first by the charging
decision and then by any sentencing bargaining, that the scope of the
judge's discretion actually may be quite narrow. The opportunity to
impart information may be more restorative for the victim than influ-
ential on the actual sentence imposed. By the time of sentencing, the
victim may have little to offer the court other than an emotional plea
which will have no effect on a preordained sentence. After a trial con-
viction, if there already has been a successful victim-prosecutor collab-
oration, the trust and respect cultivated throughout the case will have
been reflected in the improved quality and impact of the victim's testi-
mony, making a sentencing statement less critical.
In routine cases, prosecutors rarely invite victims to articulate
how the crime has affected them. Since these feelings may change
over time, unless the prosecutor inquires regularly, the information
will either be lacking or inaccurate. Too often, nothing more is known
at the time of sentencing than at the time of the crime. Some other
person, perhaps a probation officer, has elicited information from the
victim to include in a written report. Prosecutorial involvement for
the first time at this stage would not only be redundant, it would be
insincere - too little, too late. Instead of disturbing the traditional
focus at sentencing on the defendant's deserts, the victim's story
should be injected into the earlier stages when critical decisions about
charging and pleading have a greater affect.
My argument for collaboration and victim inclusion in decision
making is different from the demands made by victim right's advo-
cates. I am addressing the tenor and quality of lawyering by prosecu-
tors rather than urging the creation of rights. For example, one of the
provisions of the most recent version of a proposed Victims' Rights
Amendment contained a constitutional right to be heard and to sub-
mit a written statement at a proceeding to determine the acceptance
of a negotiated guilty plea.85 Open communication and mutual com-
mitment by the prosecutor and the victim should obviate the need to
legislate such participation.
Assuming that there is no legal obligation on the part of prosecu-
tor to take into account the victim's wishes, preferences, and opinions,
85 SJ. Res. 6, 105 h Cong., 1" Sess. (1997).
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are there any reasons to change the traditional model that cause so
much victim marginalization? Greater inclusion of the victim in deci-
sion making could benefit dubious prosecutors in any of several ways.
* Efficiency
More collaboration between the prosecutor and the victim should
increase efficiency by reducing delay and increasing access to in-
formation. If information is exchanged, a prosecutor will profit from
increased opportunities to elicit facts which lead to theories. The
common practice of relying on second-hand information is practical,
only if the prosecutor's goal is no more than case management or a
quick guilty plea. But if the prosecutor strives for a fair disposition of
a case, whether by trial or guilty plea, then detailed, genuine knowl-
edge about the facts of the case is essential.
Given the large case loads of the typical prosecutor, coupled with
the high percentage of cases resolved by guilty plea, many prosecutors
postpone serious preparation until the eve of trial. Last minute wit-
ness preparation that uncovers heretofore unknown evidence is
commonplace, leading to embarrassment before the judge, or possibly
even dismissal. Thorough and frequent contact with the victim would
avoid this.
Greater victim involvement might also induce more effort to me-
diate rather than litigate a case. Mediation is a tool that is often used
in connection with misdemeanor prosecutions in overcrowded lower
courts. Any incentive to choose an alternative method of dispute res-
olution would be an advantage to the court system.
* Fairness
Accuracy and reliability in charging and plea negotiations would
be enhanced through communication and consideration of the victim's
views resulting in more faith generally in the criminal justice system.
The initial charges would reflect the actual criminal conduct not just
the hearsay information provided by the police. Although a victim
might not appreciate all of the reasons for a particular guilty plea or
sentence, and might even be hostile to the prosecutor for discounting
the seriousness of the case, more consultation, explanation, or even
persuasion would ameliorate this dissatisfaction.
The court and defense attorney would be more inclined to coop-
erate in a fair plea and sentence based on real, not speculative infor-
mation. In addition, more contact with the victim would increase the
prosecutor's integrity in the victim's eyes, making any plea bargain or
sentence more credible after thorough and thoughtful explanation.
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* Confidence in the system
Our criminal justice system is criticized for many reasons. Both
the public and individual victims lack faith in the efficiency and fair-
ness of the process. Public confidence would be bolstered by changing
the current impression that the system does not value the interests of
victims, and that their views have little influence on the outcome of a
case. People would be more likely to cooperate when needed, and to
trust rather than chastise the prosecutor who dismisses charges or di-
verts prosecutions.
Increased victim participation would also promote greater
prosecutorial accountability. A more conspicuous victim would force
the prosecutor to account for a particular decision. Because discre-
tionary decisions would be more visible, prosecutors would have to be
able to justify their exercise of discretion thereby enhancing public
faith that the prosecutor is worthy of this vast power.
* Victim satisfaction
Criminal prosecution is not a consumer product for which the vic-
tim has to give a seal of approval, unlike private representation where
client satisfaction is an explicit goal. Nonetheless, it seems obvious
that something is wrong if a crime victim emerges even more dis-
empowered and frustrated after a criminal prosecution than after the
crime itself. To the victim, her story is unique so she cannot under-
stand when the prosecutor does not share, or at least empathize with
that view. Admittedly, victim satisfaction is not the primary goal of
the prosecutor, but as goals go, it is lower on the list than it should
be. 86 Many crime victims who do not grasp the implications of proce-
dural or evidentiary rules and do not comprehend how their case is
being judged relative to other cases would be able to understand if
given a reasonable explanation.
Inclusion usually motivates cooperation. The victim might be
more helpful about gathering evidence, more open to considering al-
ternatives approaches, and more understanding about the other fac-
tors a prosecutor has to take into account. Collaboration fortifies the
self-esteem of the victim.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have used the term victim-centered prosecution to describe a
collaborative relationship that includes more consultation and expla-
nation about the process, the prosecutor's options, and the broader
context in which the prosecutor operates. It is a process which gives
86 See McDonald, supra note 17.
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the victim some choice about being involved in decision making. Any
thoughtful prosecutor internally reflects on, as well as openly debates
with supervisors and colleagues about, the best course of action. If
the prosecutor were to share this thinking with the victim, listen to the
victim's response, and explain the ultimate decision in terms that
reflect a consideration for the victim's experience, viewpoint and
desires, victim participation would be vastly increased and improved
with all of the beneficial effects mentioned above. Of course, there
will be many times when this approach might create friction with a
victim who is not satisfied with the specific outcome. Nevertheless,
assuming that the decision was rational, fair, and based on the infor-
mation provided by the victim, the process of inclusion itself will have
independent value which may be appreciated by the victim, even if
only at a later, more reflective time.
Participation also means that the victim should be informed
about developments in the case, including non-events. Often long ad-
journments between court appearances, postponements for proce-
dural reasons, and a host of miscellaneous events cause long delays
during which time the victim is ignorant of what is happening. It is not
unusual for a year to elapse between contacts between the day of
arrest and the final disposition. Since the prosecutor knows that
either nothing of consequence is occurring, or believes that the victim
would not understand or care, the prosecutor often overlooks the vic-
tim's curiosity and concern. The simple medicine of communication
would decrease victim alienation and increase victim incentives to
continue to care about the case.
Ultimately, my suggestions may be more about form than sub-
stance since the prosecutor can never abrogate decision making to the
victim, or even consider the victim a full partner in the process. None-
theless, the prosecutor can create a dynamic that recognizes and cred-
its victim's opinions, interests, and needs. Furthermore, although I
have made some simplistic assumptions about the views victims bring
to the relationship with the prosecutor, the lessons of client-counsel-
ing which credit the "autonomy, intelligence, dignity and basic moral-
ity of the individual.. . ." have a place in this very unique relationship.
In the clinical education universe, the prosecutorial cohort is
small. While there may be only a few of us directly teaching and su-
pervising students in this context, every year our former students pour
into prosecutors' offices where they receive little reinforcement for a
victim-centered approach. This paper attempts to fill this gap by of-
fering an approach to prosecutor-victim communication that imports
some of the values of client-based counseling advocated by most clini-
cians that can be taught to law students in prosecutor's clinics as well
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as fledgling assistant district attorneys. At the end of the day, the con-
versation might sound like this:
Denise: After our many conversations, I understand why it made sense
for him to plead guilty. You listened to me and understood that I
was afraid to get up on the witness stand and show my scar to all
those people. But you helped me see that I had to be willing to
do that in order to put him away. I now see the cause and effect
- I was willing to go to court, so he got scared and pled guilty.
You protected me and he still got punished. Thank you.
Liz: You're welcome.

